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Are we now living in a German Europe? In an interview with EUROPP editors Stuart A Brown
and Chris Gilson, Ulrich Beck discusses German dominance of the European Union, the
divisive effects of austerity policies, and the relevance of his concept of the ‘risk society’ to the
current problems being experienced in the Eurozone.
How has Germany come to dominate the European Union?
Well it happened somehow by accident. Germany has actually created an ‘accidental empire’.
There is no master plan; no intention to occupy Europe. It doesn’t have a military basis, so all the talk about
a ‘Fourth Reich’ is misplaced. Rather it has an economic basis – it ’s about economic power – and it ’s
interesting to see how in the anticipation of  a European catastrophe, with f ears that the Eurozone and
maybe even the European Union might break down, the landscape of  power in Europe has changed
f undamentally.
First of  all there’s a split between the Eurozone countries and the non-Eurozone countries. Suddenly f or
example the UK, which is only a member of  the EU and not a member of  the Eurozone, is losing its veto
power. It ’s a tragic comedy how the Brit ish Prime Minister is trying to tell us that he is still the one who is in
charge of  changing the European situation. The second split is that among the Eurozone countries there is
an important division of  power between the lender countries and the debtor countries. As a result Germany,
the strongest economic country, has become the most powerf ul EU state.
Are austerity policies dividing Europe?
Indeed they are, in many ways. First of  all we have a
new line of  division between northern European and
southern European countries. Of  course this is very
evident, but the background f rom a sociological point
of  view is that we are experiencing the redistribution
of  risk f rom the banks, through the states, to the
poor, the unemployed and the elderly. This is an
amazing new inequality, but we are still thinking in
national terms and trying to locate this redistribution
of  risk in terms of  national categories.
At the same time there are two leading ideologies in
relation to austerity policies. The f irst is pretty much
based on what I call the ‘Merkiavelli’ model – by this I
mean a combination of  Niccolò Machiavelli and Angela
Merkel. On a personal level, Merkel takes a long time
to make decisions: she’s always waiting until some
kind of  consensus appears. But this kind of  waiting
makes the countries depending on Germany’s decision
realise that actually Germany holds the power. This
deliberate hesitation is quite an interesting strategy in terms of  the way that Germany has taken over
economically.
The second element is that Germany’s austerity policies are not based simply on pragmatism, but also
The second element is that Germany’s austerity policies are not based simply on pragmatism, but also
underlying values. The German objection to countries spending more money than they have is a moral issue
which, f rom a sociological point of  view, t ies in with the ‘Protestant Ethic’. It ’s a perspective which has
Martin Luther and Max Weber in the background. But this is not seen as a moral issue in Germany, instead
it’s viewed as economic rationality. They don’t see it as a German way of  resolving the crisis; they see it as
if  they are the teachers instructing southern European countries on how to manage their economies.
This creates another ideological split because the strategy doesn’t seem to be working so f ar and we see
many f orms of  protest, of  which Cyprus is the latest example. But on the other hand there is still a very
important and powerf ul neo- liberal f action in Europe which continues to believe that austerity policies are
the answer to the crisis.
Is the Eurozone crisis proof that we live in a risk society?
Yes, this is the way I see it. My idea of  the risk society could easily be misunderstood because the term
‘risk’ actually signif ies that we are in a situation to cope with uncertainty, but to me the risk society is a
situation in which we are not able to cope with the uncertainty and consequences that we produce in
society.
I make a distinction between ‘f irst modernity’ and our current situation. First modernity, which lasted f rom
around the 18th century until perhaps the 1960s or 1970s, was a period where there was a great deal of
space f or experimentation and we had a lot of  answers f or the uncertainties that we produced: probability
models, insurance mechanisms, and so on. But then because of  the success of  modernity we are now
producing consequences f or which we don’t have any answers, such as climate change and the f inancial
crisis. The f inancial crisis is an example of  the victory of  a specif ic interpretation of  modernity: neo- liberal
modernity af ter the breakdown of  the Communist system, which dictates that the market is the solution and
that the more we increase the role of  the market, the better. But now we see that this model is f ailing and
we don’t have any answers.
We have to make a distinction between a risk society and a catastrophe society. A catastrophe society
would be one in which the motto is ‘too late’: where we give in to the panic of  desperation. A risk society in
contrast is about the anticipation of  f uture catastrophes in order to prevent them f rom happening. But
because these potential catastrophes are not supposed to happen – the f inancial system could collapse,
or nuclear technology could be a threat to the whole world – we don’t have the basis f or experimentation.
The rationality of  calculating risk doesn’t work anymore. We are trying to anticipate something that is not
supposed to happen, which is an entirely new situation.
Take Germany as an example. If  we look at Angela Merkel, a f ew years ago she didn’t believe that Greece
posed a major problem, or that she needed to engage with it as an issue. Yet now we are in a completely
dif f erent situation because she has learned that if  you look into the eyes of  a potential catastrophe,
suddenly new things become possible. Suddenly you think about new institutions, or about the f iscal
compact, or about a banking union, because you anticipate a catastrophe which is not supposed to
happen. This is a huge mobilising f orce, but it ’s highly ambivalent because it can be used in dif f erent ways.
It could be used to develop a new vision f or Europe, or it could be used to justif y leaving the European
Union.
How should Europe solve its problems?
I would say that the f irst thing we have to think about is what the purpose of  the European Union actually
is. Is there any purpose? Why Europe and not the whole world? Why not do it alone in Germany, or the UK,
or France?
I think there are f our answers in this respect. First, the European Union is about enemies becoming
neighbours. In the context of  European history this actually constitutes something of  a miracle. The second
purpose of  the European Union is that it can prevent countries f rom being lost in world polit ics. A post-
European Britain, or a post-European Germany, is a lost Britain, and a lost Germany. Europe is part of  what
makes these countries important f rom a global perspective.
The third point is that we should not only think about a new Europe, we also have to think about how the
European nations have to change. They are part of  the process and I would say that Europe is about
redef ining the national interest in a European way. Europe is not an obstacle to national sovereignty; it is
the necessary means to improve national sovereignty. Nationalism is now the enemy of  the nation because
only through the European Union can these countries have genuine sovereignty.
The f ourth point is that European modernity, which has been distributed all over the world, is a suicidal
project. It ’s producing all kinds of  basic problems, such as climate change and the f inancial crisis. It ’s a bit
like if  a car company created a car without any brakes and it started to cause accidents: the company would
take these cars back to redesign them and that’s exactly what Europe should do with modernity.
Reinventing modernity could be a specif ic purpose f or Europe.
Taken together these f our points f orm what you could say is a grand narrative of  Europe, but one basic
issue is missing in the whole design. So f ar we’ve thought about things like institutions, law, and
economics, but we haven’t asked what the European Union means f or individuals. What do individuals gain
f rom the European project? First of  all I would say that, particularly in terms of  the younger generation,
more Europe is producing more f reedom. It ’s not only about the f ree movement of  people across Europe;
it ’s also about opening up your own perspective and living in a space which is essentially grounded on law.
Second, European workers, but also students as well, are now conf ronted with the kind of  existential
uncertainty which needs an answer. Half  of  the best educated generation in Spanish and Greek history lack
any f uture prospects. So what we need is a vision f or a social Europe in the sense that the individual can
see that there is not necessarily social security, but that there is less uncertainty. Finally we need to
redef ine democracy f rom the bottom up. We need to ask how an individual can become engaged with the
European project. In that respect I have made a manif esto, along with Daniel Cohn-Bendit, called “We Are
Europe”, arguing that we need a f ree year f or everyone to do a project in another country with other
Europeans in order to start a European civil society.
A more detailed discussion of the topics covered in this article is available in Ulrich Beck’s latest book, German
Europe (Polity 2013)
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